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Comment 
Martin Vranken* 
The Green Paper tnay be cotnmended for its far-reaching and thoughtful review of the 
current systern of industrial relation~ in New Zealand. However. one can criticise the tnanner 
in which some important topics are presl'nted tu the public and for omitting certain issues 
fro 111 t he deb at c. 
Narrow Focus 
The ~Green Paper. quite apart fron1 litniting ils focu~ to the private st::ctor. deals exclusively 
with what has been referred to by Szakats as the .. macro .. level of indu ~ trial law. i.e. the 
relation hip between etnployers and organised labour. A review of the individual enlploy-
ment relationship or the study of industrial law in its .. n1icro .. con1poncnt is tni ing. The 
Green Paper therefore fails to provide a cornplete picture of the position of worker in New 
Zealand as of 1986. 
The in1portance of such an overall picture needs hardly to he stressed any rnorc.lndustrial 
l<~w. or labour law. is clearly distinct from other relat~d areas of study such a~ conllnen:iid or 
cornpany bw hecausc of its social dimen~ion . It is concet ned with labour or work which is 
done in a position of(lcgal) ~ubordination. In its individual component. the crnphasis is on 
the direct relationship between en1ployer and en1ployce and historically this individual level 
of industrial law can1e first. It is only because the principle offreedon1 to contract arc oflittle 
use in what is essentially a relationship of econon1ic dependence bet\veen .. n, aster .. and 
.. servant .. that workers became organised. Thus the relationship between en1ployers and 
organised labour developed into what is known today as collective labour law. It n1u t be 
horne in n1ind. though. that an acknowledgernent of the weak bargaining position of the 
individual worker is what industrial law is all about. A systcrn of industrial relations i~ 
therefore inseparably l·inked to the ultirnate question as to the protected status of the 
individual en1ployee. whether this be resolved in any given case by rules focussing on unions 
or hy provisions for direct ernployee protection . A n1ajor pitfall of the Green Paper lies in its 
lack of ncknowledgen1en toft he Ia ttcr alternative. The Govern nHln t proposa Is for refonn only 
incidentally touch upon the position of the individual worker. 
It is undoubtedly true th~ll collective labour relations are often of rnuch n1ore societal 
significance than is the case with individual labour law. It is equally so that tnany of the 
detailed tenns of any given ernployn1entcontract nowadays are incorporated frorn awards or 
agreen1ents negotiated on behalf of the individual worker. But all this goes to strengthen the 
argun1ent that. since organised labour apparently has carne to play an increasingly crucial 
role in the life of the i ndividua I worker. extra caution is ca lied for \Vhen changes in the lield of 
colleclive industrial relations are contetnplated since the protected status of the worker in New 
Zealand is directly linked to it. State cstahlishrnent of n1inirnun1 standards by statute is low. 
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con1pared with other developed countries. The consequent reliance on self-regulation (by 
n1eans of award negotiation) for such things as the form and sorts of individual employment 
countracts. the legal effect of events that temporarily suspend the contract performance. 
illness. annual vacation. rnilitary service. strikes. etc. and. most importantly. the termination 
of the ern ployn1en t rei a tionsh ip on the employer's initiative. is obvious. Although a system of 
self-regulation does not necessarily yield inadequate results. self-regulation as it operates in 
New Zealand today is. as argued below. incapable of reaching all workers concerned. 
In spite of the presence of blanket coverage. it is indeed estimated that only something in 
excess of half a rnillion workers in the private sector have their wages and conditions of 
ernployment fixed by negotiations between unions and employers. It follows that many 
persons in the private sector currently miss out on award protection (potentially as many as 
300 000. this being the nun1ber of non-unionised persons in the private sector although both 
figures do not necessarily cover the same people). The reasons for this vary. First of all. one has 
to be ··a worker" as defined in the Industrial Relations Act. This seems self-evident. However. 
it does in1ply that apprentices miss out on award coverage under the 1973 Industrial Relations 
Act as they are deerned not to be in a master-servant relationship. 
It does not suffice to be labelled a worker. One has to be a worker ''for purposes of award 
coverage··. Here s.213 of the Industria I Relations Act holds that. to be considered a worker for 
the purpose of award or agreement coverage. one has to be employed for the ''direct or indirect 
pecuniary gain of the crnployer". The only. but crucial. exception to this prerequisite is when 
the employer is a body corporate. 
Even a "worker" employed by a .. qualified" employer does not enjoy award coverage 
auton1atically. A further requirernent is that there be a union which has negotiated an award 
or agreement. This presupposes en1ployment in a job covered by the membership rule of a 
registered union. And even then it may turn out that some workers are excluded from coverage 
by the award itself. in that they earn salaries in excess of the salary bar specified in the award 
which would otherwise apply to them. A typical example is the New Zealand Clerical Workers 
Award. where the salary bar is $18 053. 
The Green Paper identifies those .. unorganised groups" (pp. 81-97) and gives special 
attention to the ernploymcnt protection of home workers and young people. Each time the 
solution offered is protection by legislaion. One may wonder why an extension of legislative 
protection (beyond such issues as minimum wage and holidays) is not being considered fora/1 
workers. regardless of their particular em ployn1ent situation and irrespective of award and/ or 
union coverage. Statutory regulation in the already mentioned areas of contract formation as 
well as suspension and tern1ination of the ernployment relationship. would have the 
advantage of yielding uniforn1 (rninimum) results on which collective bargaining could build 
and expand. 
An exan1ple which illustrates the shortcomings of the present reliance on self-regulation is 
the grievance systcrn. As s.ll 7 of the Industrial Relations Act contains no legislative 
cornmand independently from a collective instrun1ent. it is viewed as having no direct 
enforceability (Szakats and Mulgan. 1985. p. 27). It follows that. in the absence of a European-
type Labour Court systern which would allow for .. aggrieved" individual workers to have their 
con1plaints dealt with directly. only an action at comn1on law before the ordinary courts 
remains wherever the grievance machinery is not available. It will be recalled that such 
availability depends on both union and award coverage. This raises additional problems for 
workers that have been cxernpt fron1 union n1ernhership by the newly established Union 
Men1hership Exemption Tribunal. Does their non-rnen1bership status constitute a bar to 
using s. 11 7 and. if so. docs the possihi I i ty of hri ngi ng an action at common law really provide 
for an adequate alternative·~ 
"Neutrality" of the questions 
The willingness of the present Government to engage in prior consultation with all 
interested (in a broad sense) parties is noteworthy. It allows for the decision-making process to 
he an informed one. It also represents a highly democratic approach. There is one major 
drawback. though. No government can be completely neutral in a review process such as this. 
There are 2 reasons for this. Firstly. the State is the biggest single employer in the country and 
although public sector en1ployment is not covered by the Green Paper. some overflow from 
dcvcloprnents in the private sector seems inevitable. Secondly. the Government's attitude 
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towards industrial relations has to be seen as part of its overall public policy n1aking. Thus the 
Governtnent is a directly interested party. This entails the risk ofthere being nocleardividing 
line between a Gr~en Paper (outlining the several options possible) and a '\Vhite Paper 
(containing policy decisions already made) at all tirnes. 
\Vhen turning to the actual que~tions raised in the Green Paper. it hecotncs clear that 
cet1ain ha~ic assu1nptions have served "sa starting point to the ('Jovernment's .. Framework 
for Review··. It is in1perative to identify these assun1ptions in that they may reflect underlying 
value-judgrnents held by the Ciovernrnent as to the proper functioning of a systen1 of 
industrial relations and therefore would ··colour .. its con1111itn1ent to review. 
The introduction to the Green Paper enunciates the original objectives of the ysten1 and 
the Governn1ent trategies that have been focussed upon in connection with these objectives. 
Next question 2 asks \\'hat effect these objectives and strategies have had on the outcon1e of 
union/etnployer negotiations. i\1orc specifically. it asks whether the balance of advantage 
favours union . employers. or whether il is about equal. Such phrasing of the question 
suggests that a systen1 of industrial relations ha. to airn for an equal balanc..:e between the 
bargaining parties. Although a si1nilar nttitude can also be found in industrial relations 
sy ten1s elsewhere. n1ost notably in the USA nnd the Federal Republic ofGern1any. it is an 
approc1ch to industrial relations which i~ by no n1cans self-evident. An alternativ~.: starting 
point could indeed have been to acknowledge the hasic econo1n ic i rn ha Ia nee in the etn player-
employee relationship and to stres · the subsequent need for legislathe intervention. This 
need for protective social legislation is a penn anent one ~ jnce also the econo1nic dependence 
of the worker i there to stay as well. Such an ··alternative·· approach to industrial relation~ 
may have far-reaching practical consequences. It n1eans. for instance. that it \\Ould he wrong 
to treat strike · and lock-outs as equal weapons before the law. 
A sun1ptions are also n1ade regarding the role of the State and the de ·irahle degree of 
govern n1ent involvenletH in industrial rei a tion ~.A lack of frecdon1 on beha 1 f oft he ba rgai ni ng 
partie to regulate their own relationship is believed to account. at least in part. for the current 
tnalfunctioning of the systern. It is therefore assun1ed that a reduction of goven11nent 
intervention rnay he b~neficial to the overall functioning of the indu~trial relations systen1. 
Suggested areas of r~duced involvement by the State arc the bargaining scope (question 13). 
enforcctnenl (question 19) and administration (qu~stion 2) ofawardsoragreen1ents. as w~ll a~ 
industrial action (question 39). 
On the one hand. und~rlying assumptiuns affect the type of quc:-;tions being raised and 
therefore it follows that they are not necessarily value-fr~e . On 'the other hand. 'they \V~ty the 
questions then1selves are phrased is not alway con1pletely neutral either. In son1e in~tances. 
they are forn1ulated in such a way as to be assured in advance of a contradictory answer by the 
respective parties. Exan1ples are queslions as to whether the award system houlcl continue to 
be a central feature of wage fixing (question 16). whether the powers of su pension available to 
the en1ployer in response to strike action are appropriate (question 37) and vlhether there i · a 
case for recognising a broader freedorn to picket than that provided by present law and 
precedent (question 3X). Occasionally. the question itself rnay even he provocative. a!\ in 
question 7 where con1pulsory unionism is explicitly n1ade a non-issue. Undouhtedly not even 
a more careful phrasing of the is ues at stake would have been likely to induce a general 
consensus in the suhn1 issions to he rnade. 1 ndustrial relations as such is too en1otional an area 
for this to be possible. It can only he hoped that the Government \:vill not hide behind the 
smoke screen that it itself has produced . The possihility oflirniting itself to rnarginal changes 
is tnade hoth likely and tctnpting. 
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